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Abstract
In many respects, the historical trajectory of the Russian economy during the XX cen-
WXU\KDVEHHQDWHUUDLQFRJQLWDXQWLOQRZ$VIRURI¿FLDOVWDWLVWLFVDWOHDVWWKUHHLPSRUWDQW
reasons can be given for this. First, many relevant indicators were either not measured 
or were kept secret and never published. Second, Russia (as the RSFSR) was a part of 
the USSR, and statistics for the RSFSR were much less prevalent than for the USSR as 
a whole (historical changes in Russia’s borders also require special consideration). Third, 
DQ LGHRORJLFDOGRJPD LPSOLHG WKHDEVHQFHRI LQÀDWLRQ LQ WKHSODQQHG6RYLHWHFRQRP\
WKHUHIRUHDOOGHÀDWRUVLIDQ\ZHUHXQGHUHVWLPDWHGDQGDOODJJUHJDWHVLQFRQVWDQWDQG
or comparable prices were overestimated (as were the corresponding growth rates). As 
IRUWKHXQRI¿FLDOKLVWRULFDOHVWLPDWHVPRVWRIWKHPZHUHIRFXVHGRQWKH8665QRWRQ
WKH56)65WKHUHIRUHWKHUHLVDFRQVLGHUDEOHULVNLQXVLQJWKHPDVDSUR[\IRUKLVWRULFDO
indicators of the Russian Federation.




Our second aim was to denote periods of growth and contraction in the Russian 
economy and to reveal the economic factors that caused changes in trajectory. Periods 
of contraction during the era of the planned economy were of special interest for us. We 
found that recessions had occurred, not only in the market but also in the planned Russian 
HFRQRP\RIFRXUVHZLWKDVLJQL¿FDQWUHPDUNWKDWFRQWUDFWLRQVLQWKHSODQQHGHFRQRP\
were much rarer but evidently more destructive).
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
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OLFV WKH8665"7KHSRVW6RYLHW5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ WKH5)" ,Q IDFW LW FDQ
PHDQDOORIWKHVHWKLQJVLQWKHSURSHUFRQWH[W+RZHYHUDVPRGHUQ5XVVLDLQLWV
current borders is the only economic and political reality, the economic history 
RIMXVW WKLV WHUULWRU\LVRIVSHFLDO LQWHUHVW3DUDGR[LFDOO\ZHNQRZPRUHDERXW
the historical macroeconomic trajectories of the Russian Empire ( Gerchuk, 
 9DU]DU  .DIHQJDXV  *ROGVPLWK  *UHJRU\ D
%RNDUHY  6XKDUD  0DUNHYLFK DQG +DUULVRQ  RU WKH8665
%HUJVRQ&,$-(&
0RRUVWHHQ DQG3RZHOO 'DYLHV HW DO +DUULVRQ  DQG
others)1 than we do about the contemporary RF. In fact, Russia is a country with 
a nearly unknown economic history. 
One of the main reasons for this lack of knowledge of Russia’s economic 
histor y is that systematic and comparable historical time series are unavailable. 
This situation was caused by some inherent features of the Soviet statistical sys-




a small number of regularly published indicators (because of a comprehensive re-
gime of secrecy), etc. Of course, there was a long Western tradition of high-quali-
ty research on the Soviet economy2. As a result, the most important methodo-
logical aspects for a more-or-less reliable recalculation of Soviet statis tics into 
FRQYHQWLRQDO:HVWHUQVWDQGDUGVZHUHFODUL¿HGDQGDVROLGVWDWLVWLFDOIRXQGDWLRQ
for empirical investigation of the USSR was built. The trouble is the inadequacy 
RIXVLQJKLVWRULFDOWLPHVHULHVIRUWKHHQWLUH6RYLHW8QLRQDVDQXQGLVSXWHGSUR[\
for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (the  RSFSR), which had 




UDWHV IRU ± VHH LQ SDUWLFXODU .XERQLZD  3RQRPDUHQNR 
5RVH¿HOGHDQG.XERQLZD7KHLUHVWLPDWLRQVDUHLQOLQHZLWKWKH%HUJVRQ²
&,$PHWKRGRORJLFDODSSURDFKHVDQGXVHFRQVLGHUDEOHLQWHUQDOXQSXEOLVKHGLQIRU-
mation by Rosstat (Federal State Statistics Service). No acade mic researcher could 
ever dream of improving on or repeating their recalculations of Soviet sta tistical data 
for the RSFSR into the now commonly-used SNA format. However, this dataset 
DOVRKDVWZRVHULRXVVKRUWFRPLQJV)LUVWLWGHSHQGVKHDYLO\RQWKHRI¿FLDO6RYLHW
volume indices for agriculture, retail trade and certain other sectors, and these in-
GLFHVDUHPRVWOLNHO\RYHUVWDWHGEHFDXVHRIWKHXQGHUHVWLPDWLRQRIRI¿FLDOGHÀDWRUV
VHH5RVH¿HOGHIRUDNHHQFULWLFLVPRIWKHLQLWLDO6RYLHWVWDWLVWLFVDQG:HVWHUQ








to describe the long-term trajectory of the Russian economy (the RSFSR’s and 
the RFs economies successively).3 It was not an easy task to select historical 
information for Russia in its present-day borders. However, the real trouble was 
WKHIDFWWKDWGXULQJWKHHQWLUH6RYLHWSHULRGDVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWRIGHWDLOHGHFR-
QRPLFLQIRUPDWLRQZDVFROOHFWHGWKURXJKFHQWUDOL]HG6RYLHWPLQLVWULHVDQGQRW
all important statistical indicators were published (or even calculated) at the re-
gional level.4+HQFHHVWLPDWLQJLQGLFDWRUVVXFKDVKLVWRULFDO*'3LVDQDUGXRXV
WDVNPDQ\VSHFLDOO\GHVLJQHGVWDWLVWLFDOVRXUFHVWKDWGLGQRWH[LVWLQWKH6RYLHW
Union are required), and it may be fully impossible to construct historical high-
frequency (monthly and quarterly) time series. In this paper, we attempt to meet 
a less ambitious challenge, namely, to construct long-term annual time series 
for several of the most important sectors of the Russian economy. In Section 2, 
ZHDWWHPSWWRWUDFHWKHPEDFNDVIDUDVSRVVLEOHLQIDFWPRVWRIWKHPEHJDQLQ
the late 1920s.
Our second goal was to trace Russia’s continuous historical macroeconomic tra-
jectory (the RSFSR and the RF), to denote periods of growth and contraction in 
the Russian economy and to reveal the economic factors that caused changes in 
the trajectory (see Section 3). Periods of contraction during the era of the planned 
economy were of special interest because even now many think that economic reces-







to believe this dogma. The methodological trick is now well known: the Soviet 
&HQWUDO6WDWLVWLFDO$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ &6$FRPSDUHGSULFHVRQO\ IRU VWULFWO\XQ-
FKDQJHG SURGXFWV %HFDXVH SULFH LQFUHDVHV ZHUH SURKLELWHG ZLWKRXW H[SOLFLW
JRYHUQPHQWSHUPLVVLRQRI¿FLDOVWDWLVWLFVXVXDOO\VKRZHGQRRUYHU\ ORZSULFH
LQFUHDVHV +RZHYHU LI D SURGXFHU PRGL¿HG HYHQ VOLJKWO\ LWV SURGXFW WKHQ




 3 +HUHDIWHU ZH VKDOO XVH ³5XVVLD´ DV D V\QRQ\P IRU WKH5XVVLDQ )HGHUDWLRQ WKH5) DQGRU WKH5XVVLDQ
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (the RSFSR).




7KLV GRHV QRWPHDQ WKDW DOO RI WKH6RYLHW ³YROXPH LQGLFHV´ DUH FRPSOHWHO\










ders during these decades. The most important are:
x WKHH[FOXVLRQRI.D]DNKVWDQDQG.\UJ\]VWDQIURPWKH56)65LQWKH\
UHFHLYHG WKHKLJKHVW SRVVLEOH VWDWXV RI D ³8QLRQ 5HSXEOLF´ LQ WKHUHJLRQDO
structure of the USSR). Therefore, we excluded the data for these territories 
IURPWKHRI¿FLDOGDWDIRUWKH56)65IRUWKH\HDUVWKURXJK
x WKHWUDQVIHU RI &ULPHD IURP WKH56)65 WR WKH8NUDLQLDQ 6RYLHW 6RFLDOLVW















Sectors of Economy Units Period*
Industry
,QGH[RILQGXVWULDOSURGXFWLRQRI¿FLDO   1929–2015
Agriculture
Livestock inventory 0LOOLRQKHDG 1927–2014
Grain production+ 0LOOLRQWRQQHV ±
Grain area planted 0LOOLRQKHFWDUHV 1925–2014
Transportation
Railroad freight transportation 0LOOLRQWRQQHV ±
Residential construction
1HZFRPSOHWLRQVVWDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGHVWDEOLVKPHQWV 0LOOLRQVTPHWHUV ±
New completions, population[ 0LOOLRQVTPHWHUV ±





6DNKDOLQ ZLWK VHYHUDO .XULO ,VODQGV LQ WKH(DVW ZHUH LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWR
the RSFSR. The economic role of these territories is not negligible (accord-
LQJWR5RVVWDWLWPD\EHXSWRRI*'38QIRUWXQDWHO\DQ\FRUUHFWLRQLV
impossible because there is no information on economic conditions in these 
regions prior to their accession to the USSR as parts of the RSFSR. Thus, we 
can only suppose that the growth rates for certain macroeconomic indicators 
ZHUHRYHUVWDWHGIRUEXWQRWWRDJUHDWH[WHQW
2XUPDLQVRXUFHVRIRI¿FLDOGDWDZHUH
x databases from RosstatVZHEVLWHZZZJNVUX
x DQQXDOVWDWLVWLFDO\HDUERRNVIRUWKH8665DQGWKH56)65RWKHUQRQSHULRGLF
RI¿FLDOVWDWLVWLFDOKDQGERRNV
x GRFXPHQWV QHYHU SXEOLVKHG E\ WKH6RYLHW&HQWUDO 6WDWLVWLFDO$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ
&6$DQGE\RWKHUDJHQFLHVRIWKH6RYLHWJRYHUQPHQWWKRVHGRFXPHQWVDUH






from base indices published by several independent (non-government) researchers 
(see Table 2). All of these authors estimated their indices as a weighted  average 
RIWHFKQLFDOEDVHLQGLFHVRQHLQGH[SHULQGXVWULDOSURGXFWLWVRXWSXWLVLQSK\VL-
cal units). The authors used various weights and various sets of goods. The total 




  Scanned copies of most of them can be found at the privately-owned website KWWSLVWPDWLQIRVWDWLVWLFV.






Alternative annual indices of industrial production for Russia.
Source Period Number of 
products
Suhara (2000) ± 100
Ponomarenko (2002) ± 117
$OHNVHHYDQG$OHNVHHYHWDO ± 222
Smirnov (2013a) ± 
%DUDQRYDQG%HVVRQRY+ ± 
%DUDQRYDQG%HVVRQRY+ 1995–2010 
Note: + time series were kindly supplied by the authors for our research.
13566PLUQRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
3. Economic Dynamics in Russia, from the late 1920s to 2015
3.1. Main Annual Indicators Trajectories
The long-term trajectories for the main Russian macroeconomic indicators are 










1990 indicates an average overshoot of 2.0–2.5 percentage points. On the whole, 
WKHRI¿FLDOLQGH[URVH¿YHWLPHVGXULQJWKLVSHULRGZKLOHWKHPHDQDOWHUQDWLYHLQGH[
rose 2.5 times.11 On the other hand, the two time series of rates moved in a more-
RUOHVVV\QFKURQL]HGPDQQHUGXULQJWKLVSHULRGWKHFRUUHODWLRQFRHI¿FLHQWLV
This means that for past periods, one may use not only alternative indices but also 
WKHRI¿FLDOLQGH[WRGDWHGHFHOHUDWLRQVDQGDFFHOHUDWLRQVRILQGXVWULDOWUHQGV
7KHPRVW GH¿QLWLYH GHFOLQHV LQ LQGXVWULDO SURGXFWLRQ WRRN SODFH LQ 
±±DQG
Agriculture.:HXVHGOLYHVWRFNLQYHQWRU\DVDPDLQLQGLFDWRUWRFKDUDFWHUL]H




x ± FROOHFWLYL]DWLRQ13 The rural population slaughtered more than 
KDOIRI WKHLUSULYDWH OLYHVWRFN ,W LVZHOONQRZQIURPPDQ\³QRQVWDWLVWLFDO´
sources (including memories and witnesses) that the main driver of this 
GURSZDVDVWURQJXQZLOOLQJQHVVWRWXUQRYHUSULYDWHOLYHVWRFNWR³FROOHFWLYH
IDUPHUV´14,15DQRWKHUVHULRXVUHDVRQZDVDGH¿FLWRIIHHGIRUKRUVHVDQGFDWWOH
x ± WKH¿UVW WZR \HDUV RI WKHZDU EHWZHHQ WKH8665 DQG 1D]L
*HUPDQ\DFRQVLGHUDEOHDPRXQWRI5XVVLDQWHUULWRU\ZDVWHPSRUDULO\ORVW
 10 :HDOVRDWWHPSWHGWRFUHDWHDVHPLORJVFDOHDQGFKDUWVIRU<R<FKDQJHVEXWFKDUWVIRUDEVROXWHOHYHOV





 12 As supplementary indicators for agriculture, we also used time series on grain production and on grain area 
SODQWHG,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHDYHUDJHKDUYHVWDIWHUVOLJKWO\PRUHWKDQPLOOLRQWRQQHVLVURXJKO\












x DQGWKH\HDUVRIFURSIDLOXUHV the number of pigs 




x ± KLJK H[SRUWV RI JUDLQ DJDLQVW WKHEDFNGURS RI ORZ FURS \LHOGV
EURXJKWKLJKIRGGHUSULFHVORZSURGXFLQJOLYHVWRFNZHUHVODXJKWHUHG
Residential construction ,Q  DYHUDJH SHU FDSLWD XUEDQ ÀRRU VSDFH LQ
WKH56)65ZDVRQO\ VTXDUHPHWHUV(YLGHQWO\ WKHUHZDV D JUHDW QHHG IRU
housing. However, in a planned economy, because limits to production were set 








Railroad freight transportation. The volume of railroad freight transportation 
LVDQLQGLFDWRUWKDWLVGH¿QLWHO\ZHOOV\QFKURQL]HGZLWKWKHOHYHORIHFRQRPLFDF-
tivity in Russia.172UGLQDULO\LWVJURZWKLVKLJKO\PRQRWRQLFDGHFOLQHLQUDLOURDG
freight transportation always indicates serious problems in the Russian economy.
Crude oil prices0DQ\ EHOLHYH WKDW WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\ LV KLJKO\ GHSHQ-
dent on the international oil market (as was the Soviet economy prior to 1991). 
7KHDQQXDO WLPH VHULHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO SULFHV IRU5XVVLDQ RLO ³8UDOV´ EHJDQ
just recently in 1995, but the trajectory of the Russian oil market is very close 
to the trajectories for other types of oil, which means that we can use historical 
SULFHVIRULQWHUQDWLRQDORLOW\SHVDVDSUR[\IRUWKH8UDOVSULFH,WFDQEHDVVXPHG
that high or rising oil prices were positive for the Russian economy, while low or 
declining prices were negative.
The years of decline in absolute terms for all indicators under consideration 
are highlighted in Figure 2 with dark gray circles. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to reasonably combine all of these indica-
tors into a single composite: a) the indices are available for different time pe-
ULRGVDQGKDYHGLIIHUHQWRPLVVLRQV XVXDOO\ LQ WKHVE VRPH LQGLFHVDUH
ÀRZV HJ LQGXVWULDORXWSXWRWKHUVDUHVWRFN HJ OLYHVWRFN LQYHQWRU\DQG
PRVW LPSRUWDQWO\ F WKHUH LV QR LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW SRWHQWLDO ³ZHLJKWLQJV´ IRU
WKHFRPSRQHQWVWKHRQO\WKLQJZHPD\EHDZDUHRILVWKDWWKHVHZHLJKWLQJVKDYH
FKDQJHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\VLQFHWKHHQGRIWKHV7KHUHIRUHDOOZHFDQGRLVFDUH-
fully trace the trajectories for all of the indicators, look for their contractions and 
WKHQ²EDVHGRQTXDOLWDWLYHDQDO\VLV²DWWHPSWWRLGHQWLI\\HDUVZLWKRYHUDOOFRQ-







3.2. Overall Contractions in the Russian Economy
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Russia was shaken by the controversial pro-
FHVVHVRIFROOHFWLYL]DWLRQDQGLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQ$VPHQWLRQHGDERYHWKHVH\HDUV
were very destructive for the Russian animal industries: the livestock inventory in 
ZDVRQO\RIWKHOHYHO2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHUHVXOWVIRUWKHFURS
output from the Russian agricultural sector were not as bad. The total grain area 
SODQWHG LQZDVKLJKHU WKDQ LQDQGJUDLQSURGXFWLRQZDVRQO\
ORZHU'HVSLWH WKLV WKHUHZDVDJUHDW IDPLQH LQ5XVVLD LQDQG
with up to several million victims.19%HFDXVHWRWDOJUDLQSURGXFWLRQZDVQRWDV
low in 1931 and 1932, the cause of the famine could only be found in the  Soviet 
governmentVGHFLVLRQV7KHPRVWSRSXODU LGHDDOPRVWDQ³RI¿FLDO´RQHFRQ-
nects the requisition of crops from individual rural households with the needs 
RIUDSLGLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQVXSSRVHGO\WKHJUDLQZDVH[SRUWHGDQGWKHHDUQLQJV
were spent on industrial equipment).20 Indeed, the growth rates for industry 







focus on Russia only.
 20 2WKHUUHVHDUFKHUVHPSKDVL]HJUHDW ORVVHVZKLOHJDWKHULQJWKHKDUYHVWGXH WR WKHORZOHYHORIDJULFXOWXUDO
technology and the high level of irresponsibility on the part of newly established collective farmers. See 
Zhuravlev (2012). 
Fig. 2. 0DLQ5XVVLDQPDFURHFRQRPLFLQGLFDWRUV\HDUVRIFRQWUDFWLRQ
Notes: JUD\ FROXPQV²WKH\HDUV RI RYHUDOO HFRQRPLF UHFHVVLRQ GDUN JUD\ FLUFOHV²WKH\HDUV RI QHJDWLYH





LQGLFHVFDXVHGE\ LQDFFXUDWHGHÀDWRUV LQ WKHRI¿FLDO VWDWLVWLFVDV LWFDQEHRE-
VHUYHGLQWKHVDQGODWHU\HDUV
7KHUHIRUHLWLVTXLWHSODXVLEOHWKDWUHDOLQGXVWULDOJURZWKZDVFORVHWR]HURRU
even negative in 1933. Russia’s railroad freight transportation volume also fell 
LQGHFOLQHKDGEHHQYHU\UDUHEHIRUH:::HWKHUHIRUHK\SRWKHVL]HWKDW
the total level of economic activity in the RSFSR declined during 1933 and that 
WKH¿UVWFULVLVLQWKHSODQQHGHFRQRP\WRRNSODFHVRPHWLPHWKDW\HDU7KHIDPLQH
in rural areas, the very low (or even negative) growth in industry and declining 
railroad freight transportation can all be considered arguments for this proposi-
tion.21 The roots of this crisis were in the Soviet governments economic policy 
concerning the agricultural sector, as well as in the low world prices for grain 
H[SRUWVE\WKH866522
7KHQH[WHFRQRPLFFRQWUDFWLRQRFFXUUHGLQDQGZKLFKZDVREYL-
ously related to the destruction caused by the war and temporary losses of terri-
tory (Soviet statistics did not account for economic output in the territories oc-
cupied by Germany). The agricultural sector was most heavily damaged: live-
VWRFNLQYHQWRU\GURSSHGE\LQDQGE\LQJUDLQSURGXFWLRQ
GHFUHDVHGE\LQDQGE\LQ23 Railroad freight transportation 
IHOOLQDQGLQ/DVWO\DFFRUGLQJ WRRI¿FLDOGDWD LQGXVWULDO
production grew by only 4% in 1941 and declined by 9% in 1942.24 We therefore 
have strong evidence that the total output of the Russian economy did contract in 
1941, especially in 1942.
'XULQJ WKHQH[W WZR \HDUV ± VWURQJ HFRQRPLF JURZWK ZDV RE-
served as the territories previously occupied by Germany were returned to So-
YLHW FRQWURO DQG WKHSURGXFWLRQ RIPLOLWDU\ JRRGV H[SDQGHG JUHDWO\+RZHYHU
by the end of the war and shortly after, a more or less ordinary post-war crisis 
began. A considerable number of military goods and ammunition were no longer 
QHHGHGDQGWKHLUH[FHVVLYHSURGXFWLRQKDGWREHFXW7KHUHIRUHLQGXVWULDOSUR-
GXFWLRQGURSSHGE\LQDQGE\LQ257KHGURXJKWRIKDG
an additional negative effect on the Russian economy. Grain production declined 
E\LQDIWHUDGHFOLQHLQDQGOLYHVWRFNLQYHQWRU\GHFOLQHG
 21 'HWDLOHGDQDO\VHVLQ'DYLHVGRQRWFRQWUDGLFWWKLVWKHVLV






is probably less than usual because price controls were evidently stricter during the war years. In any case, 
the industrial production of the RSFSR was much more dynamic than in the USSR as a whole (a drop by 2% 






 25 ,W¶V LPSRVVLEOH WR VSOLW WKHRI¿FLDO LQGH[RI LQGXVWULDOSURGXFWLRQ LQWRPLOLWDU\DQGFLYLOLDQSDUWV+HQFH
FRPPRQVHQVHZRXOGGLFWDWHWKDWDVLJQL¿FDQWGHFUHDVHLQPLOLWDU\SURGXFWLRQWRRNSODFHEXWVHYHUDOK\SRWKHVHV
about civil production are possible. 
140 66PLUQRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
E\5DLOURDGIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWDWLRQJUHZE\LQEXWWKHUHKDGEHHQ
a decline of 1% in 1945.
7KHSRVWZDUH[SDQVLRQWKDWEHJDQLQZDVORQJDQGSURQRXQFHG*URZWK
UDWHVZHUH YHU\ KLJK LQ WKHODWH V DQG WKURXJK WKH¿UVW KDOI RI WKHV
RIWHQ DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ± DQQXDOO\ IRU LQGXVWULDO SURGXFWLRQ DQG UDLOURDG
freight transportation). They then began to slow and 25 years later dropped to 
a level of 2–3%. It is possible that they could have slowed further and quite 
TXLFNO\EXWLQWKHZRUOGSULFHIRUFUXGHRLO5XVVLD¶VPDLQH[SRUWLWHP
JUHZ WLPHVDV D UHVXOWRI23(&DFWLRQV IURP86' WR86'SHU
barrel). This price increase gave the Russian economy a respite but only until 
the end of the 1970s. 
In 1979, the second post-war crisis took place: industrial production fell by 
0.4%,27 livestock inventory by 0.2%, grain production by 33%, railroad freight 
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQE\DQGQHZUHVLGHQWLDOFRPSOHWLRQVE\±7KHFULVLVRI
was that of the planned Russian economy as a system. First, constraints had ap-
SHDUHGRQ WKHVXSSO\ VLGHXS WR WKLVPRPHQW WKHPDLQ UHVRXUFHVRI WKH5XVVLDQ
economy had ceased growing rapidly (e.g., the ratio of the urban population to 
WKHWRWDOSRSXODWLRQKDGDOPRVWUHDFKHGLWV³VDWXUDWLRQSRLQW´DQGWKHJURZWKRIWKLV
labor force, which was more productive than the rural one, had dramatically slowed 
GRZQ WKHJUDLQ DUHDSODQWHGZDVQHDULQJ LWVPD[LPXPSRWHQWLDO HWF 6HFRQG
there were no major incentives on the demand side. While a number of relatively 
modern plants for chemicals, electronics, automobiles and other industries had 
been introduced during the previous two decades, there was no large incremental 






had been completely forgotten. 
7KHFULVLVRIZDVTXLWHDFXWHEXWLWZDVQRWWRRGHHSRUWRRORQJ23(&
UDLVHG RLO SULFHV  WLPHV XS WR86'  SHU EDUUHO DQG VDYHG WKH6RYLHW
planned economy at that time, but it never returned to rapid growth. As the price 
RIRLOGHFUHDVHGPLOLWDU\H[SHQVHVIRUWKHZDULQ$IJKDQLVWDQZHQWXSDQGQR
structural problems of the planned economy were solved, the Russian economy 
ZDV WKHUHIRUH H[SHULHQFLQJ D ORQJ SHULRG RI VWDJQDWLRQ )URP  WR 





of 1973, the whole plant was completed. Total production of automobiles in 1974 (1 million) turned to be 
URXJKO\WLPHVODUJHUWKDQLQPLOOLRQ'RHVWKLVPHDQWKDWGHPDQGIRUDXWRPRELOHVZDVIXO¿OOHG"














)URP  WR  WKH¿UVW ZDYH RI WKH*UHDW 5XVVLDQ 'HSUHVVLRQ FDPH
,QGXVWULDO SURGXFWLRQ GHFUHDVHG E\  GXULQJ WKHVH WKUHH \HDUV30 railroad 
IUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWDWLRQGURSSHGE\OLYHVWRFNLQYHQWRU\ZDVGRZQE\
QHZUHVLGHQWLDOFRPSOHWLRQVPDGHE\VWDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQVGHFOLQHGE\HWF
0RQHWDU\ UHIRUP ZDV XQVXFFHVVIXO LQ  WKH¿QDQFLDO V\VWHP EHFDPH XQ
EDODQFHGDQGWKHUHZDVDQRYHUDOOGH¿FLWRIFRQVXPHUJRRGV
$W WKHHQGRI WKH8665FROODSVHGDVDXQL¿HGZKROHDQG WKH6RYLHW
SODQQHG HFRQRPLF V\VWHP FDPH WR DQ HQG5XVVLD EHJDQ WR H[LVW DV DQ LQGH
pendent state within the boundaries of the RSFSR. The new government initi-
ated serious pro-market economic reforms. These reforms were based on ideas 
SURSRVHG E\ WKH,0) DQG LQFOXGHG OLEHUDOL]DWLRQ RI SULFHV OLEHUDOL]DWLRQ RI
IRUHLJQ WUDGHSULYDWL]DWLRQRI VWDWHHQWHUSULVHVDQGVHYHUDO VWUXFWXUDO UHIRUPV




WKHVH¿YH\HDUVLQGXVWULDOSURGXFWLRQFRQWUDFWHGE\31 livestock inventory 
IHOOE\UDLOURDGIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWDWLRQGHFOLQHGE\DQGQHZUHVLGHQWLDO
FRPSOHWLRQVPDGH E\ VWDWH RUJDQL]DWLRQVZHUH GRZQE\ 7DNHQ WRJHWKHU
WKHWZRZDYHVRIWKH*UHDW5XVVLDQ'HSUHVVLRQZHUHPXFKPRUHGDPDJLQJWKDQ
WKH$PHULFDQ*UHDW'HSUHVVLRQRIWKHV)RUH[DPSOHLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
WKHPD[LPXP GHFUHDVH LQ LQGXVWULDO RXWSXW XVLQJ DQQXDO VWDWLVWLFV ZDV 
IURPWRLQ5XVVLDWKLVLQGLFDWRUZDVIURPWR
7KHUHZHUHWKUHHPDLQUHDVRQVIRUWKLVGURS7KH¿UVWZDVWKHGLVWRUWHGVWUXF-
ture of the Russian economy. Since it had been destroyed by the planning sys-
tem, the output of military goods and certain low quality products was too high. 
In a market economy, without a single planning (decision-making) center, there 
would be no reason to produce these goods in the same quantities. Therefore, 
the production volumes for large numbers of goods had to be reduced. The second 
reason for the sharp decline was the low competitiveness of most sectors of 
WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\ VWURQJ FRPSHWLWLRQ IURP LPSRUWHG JRRGV DQG VHUYLFHV
displaced large numbers of Russian goods (import competition was quite new 
to Russian producers ). The third reason was that Russian owners and managers 
KDGQRH[SHULHQFHLQVHHNLQJFRQVXPHUVDQGVXSSOLHUVH[SRUWLQJUHFHLYLQJEDQN










the most important factor in the transition crisis. For this reason, output of non-





lishing communism diminished.32 The Russian economy had reached its low 
point, and there was nowhere to go but up. Therefore, in 1997, after eight years 
of continuous decrease that had seen Russian economic output cut in half, there 
was a brief period of recovery.
7KLV ¿UVW UHFRYHU\ RI WKH5XVVLDQ SRVWSODQQLQJ HUD ZDV IXOO\ GLVUXSWHG






budget was unable to service the government’s debt. Under these circumstances, 
there were two important decisions: the Russian government declared a default 
RQLWVELOOVDQGERQGVDQGWKH5XVVLDQ&HQWUDO%DQNVWRSSHGDGKHULQJWRD¿[HG
H[FKDQJH UDWH UHJLPH33 As a result, several of the largest Russian commercial 
EDQNVZHQWEDQNUXSWPDQ\ LQGLYLGXDOVDQGQRQ¿QDQFLDOFRPSDQLHV ORVW WKHLU
money, and the Russian ruble was devalued four times over a period of just 
PRQWKV,QUHDO*'3IHOOE\LQGXVWULDOSURGXFWLRQE\UDLOURDG
freight transportation by 5.9%, etc. As the base level was not especially high, 
WKHUHZDVOLWWOHURRPIRUGHFOLQHDQGWKHFRQWUDFWLRQLQZDVPXFKOHVVWKDQ
during the transition period. In any case, at its lowest point, the total output of 
WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\IHOOEDFNWROHYHOVRIWKHHDUO\V
The strong devaluation of the ruble generated the process of substituting im-
ports with domestic goods and services. This factor became the most important 





domestic demand grew by 10–12% per year. The high dependency of the Russian 
economic growth on rapidly increasing oil prices and unsecured consumer loans 
increased worries of overheating in the economy. The drastic decline in inven-
WRULHVGXULQJWKH5XVVLDQFULVLVRI±SURYHGWKLVK\SRWKHVLVWREHWUXH
7KH± UHFHVVLRQ FDPH WR 5XVVLD WKURXJK WKHZRUOG ¿QDQFLDO PDU-






LWV HQRUPRXV PRUH WKDQ KDOI D WULOOLRQ GROODUV DQG VWLOO JURZLQJ IRUHLJQ H[-
FKDQJH UHVHUYHV VXUSOXV IHGHUDO EXGJHW DQG RLO SULFHV DW PRUH WKDQ 86'
SHUEDUUHO²PLJKWEHDVDIHW\KDYHQLQDVWRUP\ZRUOGHFRQRP\2LOSULFHV
GURSWRRQHWKLUGRIWKHLUSULRUOHYHOWR86'SHUEDUUHOLQ'HFHPEHU
PDVVLYH FDSLWDO RXWÀRZ DQG GLI¿FXOWLHV LQ DFFHVV WR JOREDO ¿QDQFLDO PDUNHWV





After the recovery in 2010–2011, it became clear that the old pattern of 
Russian growth, which was based on high and continually increasing oil prices, 





LQHIIHFWLYH JRYHUQPHQW FRPSDQLHV REWDLQHG DQ XQUHDVRQDEO\ LQÀDWHG UROH
LQÀDWLRQFRQWLQXHGWREHVLJQL¿FDQW±SHU\HDUZKLFKSUHYHQWHGWKH&HQ-
WUDO%DQN IURP ORZHULQJKLJK LQWHUHVW UDWHV WKHLQYHVWPHQWFOLPDWH IRUSULYDWH
businesses (foreign and domestic) became worse, etc. As a result, dismal stagna-
tion occurred in 2012 and 2013.
6LQFH WKHVSULQJ RI  :HVWHUQ ¿QDQFLDO VDQFWLRQV FRQQHFWHG ZLWK
WKH8NUDLQLDQ FULVLV UHODWHG 5XVVLDQ VHOIDQWLVDQFWLRQV DQG²VHYHUDO PRQWKV
ODWHU²DVWHHSGHFOLQHLQRLOSULFHVKDYHSXWWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\RQWKHWKUHV
KROG RI D QHZ UHFHVVLRQ RU UDWKHU VWDJÀDWLRQ EHFDXVH LQÀDWLRQ KDV ULVHQ WR
GRXEOHGLJLWOHYHOV0RVWH[SHUWVSUHGLFWDFRQWUDFWLRQLQUHDO5XVVLDQ*'3RI
XSWR±LQ7KLVUHFHVVLRQZLOOKDUGO\EHGHHSHUDVQRVLJQL¿FDQWLQ-
ventories have been accumulated. However, the period without steady economic 
growth in Russia may really be quite prolonged. 
Table 3 shows all nine recessions for the Russian economy over the past 
\HDUV±35
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we compiled several important annual time series for the  RSFSR 
and the RF in physical units and corrected them for territorial changes. This 
allowed us to trace the trajectory of the Russian economy (the economy of 
the  RSFSR and the RF) from the late 1920s up to the present time. Although we 
GLGQRWHVWLPDWHKLVWRULFDO*'3IRU5XVVLD5XVVLDQGDWDRQWUDGHDQGVHUYLFHV
are very incomplete and unreliable for the Soviet period, and data on foreign trade 
DUHFRPSOHWHO\XQDYDLODEOHZHFRXOGGLVFHUQWKHSHULRGVRIHFRQRPLFH[SDQVLRQ





In total, there were nine recessions in the Russian economy (two of them 
PHUJHGDV WZRVXFFHVVLYH³ZDYHV´RI WKH*UHDW5XVVLDQ'HSUHVVLRQ²WKH¿UVW
just before the collapse of the USSR and the second immediately following). 
)RXUFRQWUDFWLRQVWRRNSODFHGXULQJWKH\HDUSHULRGRIWKHSODQQHGHFRQRP\
RQHZDVDWUDQVLWLRQDOFULVLVLWODVWHGIRU¿YH\HDUVWKHODVWIRXURFFXUUHGGXU-
LQJ WKHPRGHUQ²PRUHRUOHVV RUGLQDU\²PDUNHW5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\ GXULQJ LWV
24-year history. 
Evidently, contractions of output under the planned Soviet economy occurred 
less frequently than under market conditions. Until the very end, they were also less 
profound. We believe this is because in a market economy, any economic agent will 
pay for his own (or someone elseVHUURUVLQWKHQHDUIXWXUHPLVWDNHQDFWLRQVZLOO
soon have consequences. On the contrary, in a planned economy, the consequences 
of erroneous decisions may be contained through new commands and directives, but 
WKHUHZLOOEHDQLQHYLWDEOH³GHIDXOW´LQWKHHQG,IRQHGRHVQRWFRUUHFWRQHs errors 
UHJXODUO\WKHQKHZLOOKDUGO\EHVXFFHVVIXOZKHQDGLI¿FXOWQHZVLWXDWLRQDULVHV 
  A considerable amount of economic literature is dedicated to this period of Russian economic history (e.g., 










1979 ([KDXVWLRQRIH[WHQVLYHIDFWRUV LQFOXGLQJ WKHFRQYHUVLRQRI WKHSRSXODWLRQIURPUXUDO




system). All structural problems of the late Soviet planned economic system were 
DJJUDYDWHGE\YDJXHUHIRUPVDQGGHFUHDVLQJRLOSULFHV8QEDODQFHG¿QDQFLDOV\VWHPDQG
RYHUDOOGH¿FLWRIFRQVXPHUJRRGV
± 7KHVHFRQG ZDYH RI WKH*UHDW 5XVVLDQ 'HSUHVVLRQ WKHWUDQVLWLRQ IURP D SODQQHG WR
DPDUNHWHFRQRP\7KHFRPSOHWHDEVHQFHRI³PDUNHWH[SHULHQFH´GLVWRUWHGVWUXFWXUH
of the economy, low competitiveness of Russian goods and services and incompleteness 
of market reforms resulted in the Russian economys output declining by roughly half.
 7KH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\ZDV DIIHFWHG E\ WKH6RXWKHDVW$VLDQ ¿QDQFLDO FULVLV ,QWHQVLYH
IRUHLJQ FDSLWDO RXWÀRZDQG D GHFOLQH RI5XVVLDQ RLO SULFHV WR86'±SHU EDUUHO
forced default on treasury bills and bonds, bankruptcy of several of the largest 
commercial banks, loss of money by many economic agents, contraction in total output 
E\DSSUR[LPDWHO\DQGGHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHUXEOHE\DIDFWRURI
± $IWHU WKH/HKPDQ %URWKHUV EDQNUXSWF\ LQ 6HSWHPEHU  5XVVLDQ EDQNV DQG
FRPSDQLHVZHUHQHDUO\FXWRII IURPJOREDO¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWVPDVVLYHFDSLWDORXWÀRZ
began from Russia and other emerging markets and oil prices fell to one-third of their 
pre-crisis levels. Overheating of pre-crisis domestic demand and a lack of skill in 
PDQDJLQJLQYHQWRULHVUHVXOWHGLQDVLJQL¿FDQWGHFOLQHLQSURGXFWLRQ
±" &RQVLVWHQW TXHOOLQJ RI HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VSLULW DQG H[FHVVLYH DGPLQLVWUDWLYH SUHVVXUH RQ
business paved the way for the recession triggered by the mutual sanctions from the West 
and especially by the radical drop in oil prices. At the moment, any positive drivers for 
economic growth are not very obvious.
14566PLUQRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
We strongly believe that the main reason for the depth and endurance of the tran-
VLWLRQDO FULVLV LQ WKH¿UVW KDOI RI WKHV ZDV VLPSO\ DQ ³RVVL¿FDWLRQ´ RI
the Soviet planning system with all of its mechanisms and proportions: because 
WKHUHZDVQRSROLWLFDOZLOOWRDGMXVWLWJUDGXDOO\LW¿QDOO\EURNHRIIFRPSOHWHO\
Therefore, in our judgment, the steep drop during the two waves of the Great 
5XVVLDQ'HSUHVVLRQLVGXHHQWLUHO\WRWKH6RYLHWFRPPDQGV\VWHP:HFRQVLGHU
the risk of a sharp decline after a long period of stable growth as a special risk for 
planned economies.37 
Of course, good or bad decisions made by monetary and non-monetary authori-
WLHVDUHVLJQL¿FDQWQRWRQO\IRU5XVVLDEXWDOVRIRUPDQ\RWKHUQDWLRQV)RUH[DPSOH












only a few giant establishments and sometimes politically or ideologically (not 
purely economically) motivated decisions protected the Soviet economy from 
remarkable contractions for decades. However, was its far lower ability to self-
DGMXVWQRWVLPSO\WKHRWKHUVLGHRIWKHVDPHFRLQ"
7KHUROH RI LQWHUQDO LPEDODQFHV DQG H[WHUQDO VKRFNV HVSHFLDOO\ IURPZRUOG
RLO PDUNHWV ZHUH DOVR VLJQL¿FDQW HVSHFLDOO\ DV 5XVVLD EHFDPHPRUH RSHQ WR
the world, not only through markets for goods and services but also through 
¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV7KHFULVHVRIDQG±ZHUHGH¿QLWHO\SURYRNHGE\
H[WHUQDOSURFHVVHV7KHFULVHVRI±DQGZHUHPDGHGHHSHUE\
low oil prices, and the crisis of 1979 was softened and even stopped by rising oil 
prices, but the roots of all four of these recessions were inside Russia, not outside.
New rounds of research on the cycles of economic activity in planned (com-
PDQG HFRQRPLHV DUH GH¿QLWHO\ RQ WKHDJHQGD$V IRU 5XVVLD RXU SDSHU KDV
 created a fair statistical basis for them.
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Appendix A. Main Russian Macroeconomic Indicators, 1928—2015*
<HDUV ,QGH[RI 
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million tonnes million 
hectares
million square metres million  
tonnes
 na na  50.0 50.0  na na na 
1929 20.0 na  na 45.5  na na na 107.1
1930 22.0 na  na 52.5  na na na 133.7
1931  na 57.0 na 43.4 70.2 na na na 144.9
1932 15.0 na 50.7 47.5 47.5  na na na 151.2
1933   5.2 na 52.5 na   na na na 150.2
1934 19.2 na  na  71.9 na na na na






















































































































million tonnes million 
hectares
million square metres million  
tonnes
  na 72.2 na   na na na na
1937 11.2 na  70.4  73.1 na na na 299.3
 12.1 na  na  71.4 na na na 295.3
1939 17.2 na  na   na na na 317.5
1940 10.5 na 91.1  73.0 70.1 na na na 333.9
1941  na  45.5 75.9  na na na 322.7
1942 ± na 55.7 24.0 44.0  na na na 
1943 17.5 na 59.5   51.4 na na na 
1944 13.2 na     na na na 271.0
1945 ± na  25.4 na 50.9 na na na 
 –21.7 na  21.2 na 50.0 7.0 na 2.5 
1947 19.3 na  35.7 na 53.3 7.3 na 3.3 302.1
 24.2 na 77.9 34.2 na  9.0 na 3.3 370.9
1949  na   na   na 3.3 439.3
1950 19.9 na   na  11.9 na  
1951 15.4 na  47.5 na  14.1 na 4.3 547.9
1952 10.9 na 97.9 51.9 na  14.1 na 4.3 
1953 11.2 na 101.5  na   na 4.3 
1954 12.9 na 102.1  na 72.5 17.5 na 4.5 
1955 11.7 na 105.1 54.7 na  17.1 na 4.7 
  na   na 74.4 20.9 na  
1957 9.0 na 117.9 54.9 na 72.7  na 7.7 
 9.1 na  72.9 na 72.5  na 14.2 970.3
1959 11.0 na 132.2  na   na 14.5 
  na 133.1  na 71.4  na  1140.7
   143.3 70.3 na 74.5  na 12.4 
 9.0    na 79.2  na  
  5.3 124.9  na 79.4 39.4 na  
     na  37.7 na 7.7 1350.0
 7.2 5.2 139.1  na  40.2 na 7.3 
   141.5  na  41.3 na 7.1 1441.3
 9.9    na 74.9  na  1514.9
  5.1   na 74.3  na 5.9 
  4.2 140.2  na 73.5 45.9 na 5.4 
1970  4.4  107.4 na 72.7  na 5.0 
1971  4.2   na  49.5 na  
1972  4.3 152.7  na 73.1 50.3 na 4.4 
1973 7.3 4.9 157.0 121.5 na  51.9 na  
1974  5.7  105.1 na  52.5 na 4.3 
1975 7.2 4.5 151.5 72.4 na 77.0 52.9 na 4.0 
 4.9 3.2 152.9 119.0 na 77.2 52.0 na 3.3 2041.5
1977 5.4  159.5  na  52.7 na 3.3 2072.2
 4.5 1.4  127.4 na 77.0 52.4 na 3.1 
1979 3.0 –0.4   na 75.9  na 2.9 2010.2
 3.0 1.7 159.1 97.2 na 75.5 52.1 4.0 2.9 2047.9























































































































million tonnes million 
hectares
million square metres million  
tonnes
 2.7 0.7   na 72.0 52.7 3.9 na 2032.9
    104.3 na 70.7 54.3  na 2110.5
     na  53.2 3.9 na 
 3.7 1.5   na   3.7 na 
    107.5 na  57.4 3.9 na 
     na   4.2 na 
    93.7 na   5.2 na 
 1.4 –1.4   na   5.9 na 2205.0
1990 –0.1 –2.2   na   5.5 na 2140.0
1991 ± ± 145.3  na  44.0 5.4 na 1957.3
1992 ± –14.9 135.1  na   4.9 na 
1993 –13.7 –14.4 121.2 99.1 na    na 
1994 ± ± 102.7  na  32.1 7.1 na 
1995 ± –5.2 90.4  na 54.7 32.0 9.0 na 
 ± ± 77.0  na 53.4 24.3 10.0 na 911.5
1997 1.0 0.1   na  21.2 11.5 na 
 ± –4.2   na 50.7  12.1 na 
1999  9.2   na   13.7 na 947.4
2000     na  17.7  na 
2001 2.9 4.5 59.2  na 47.2  13.1 na 1057.5
2002 3.1 3.4   na 47.4 19.7 14.2 na 
2003     na 42.1 21.3 15.2 na 
2004  5.5 54.9  na  24.9  na 1221.2
2005 5.1 3.2 54.0  na   17.5 na 1273.3
  5.0 57.9  na 43.2  20.0 na 
2007  5.4 59.4  na 44.3 34.9  na 
  ± 59.0  na   27.4 na 1304.4
2009 –10.7 –9.9 59.9 97.1 na  31.3  na 
2010 7.3 9.5 59.0  na 43.2 32.9 25.5 na 1312.0
2011 5.0 na  94.2 na  35.5  na 
2012 3.4 na  70.9 na 44.4 37.3  na 1421.1
2013 0.4 na  92.4 na   30.7 na 
2014 1.7 na   na   35.2 na 1375.0
2015* –2.7 na na na na na na na na 1350.0
Note:QD²QRWDYDLODEOH²¿UVWKDOIRIWKH\HDUDWDQQXDOUDWH
Sources:VHH$SSHQGL[%
Appendix B. Statistical Sources for the Main Russian Macroeconomic 
Indicators
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Agriculture, hunting and forestry in Russia
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 Archive of the Economy. 
7KHVRXUFHV IRU HDFK LQGLFDWRU DUHSODFHG LQ D WDEOH²RQH WDEOHSHU LQGLFD-
WRU VRPHPHWKRGRORJLFDO FRPPHQWV DUH DOVRPDGH LI QHFHVVDU\7KHLQIRUPD-
WLRQVWRUHG LQ WKH5*$(ZDV LQLWLDOO\³VHFUHW´RU³WRSVHFUHW´EXWVLQFH
WKHVDPHLQGLFDWRUVKDYHEHHQSXEOLVKHGLQRI¿FLDOVWDWLVWLFDO\HDUERRNV
%,QGH[RILQGXVWULDOSURGXFWLRQRI¿FLDO
7KHRI¿FLDO LQGH[RI LQGXVWULDO SURGXFWLRQ   LV LQ IDFW QRW IXOO\
RI¿FLDO:HFDOFXODWHGLWXVLQJSXEOLVKHGRI¿FLDO<R<SHUFHQWFKDQJHVLIDYDLO-
DEOHRU<R<SHUFHQWFKDQJHVWKDWLQWXUQZHUHFDOFXODWHGXVLQJRI¿FLDOEDVH





























Note: *  as a rough estimate we used data for the whole USSR for these years.
15166PLUQRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
B.2. Livestock Inventory
We added the total number of cattle, sheep, goats and pigs. Almost continuous 
WLPHVHULHVEHJLQQLQJZLWKDUHSXEOLVKHGLQRQO\RQHVRXUFHPRUHUHFHQW















According to the present methodology (in use since 1953) the garnered grain 
LVFRXQWHGDWWKHJUDQDU\DWQHWZHLJKW$FFRUGLQJWRWKH³ROG´PHWKRGRORJ\
WKHKDUYHVWLVHVWLPDWHGLQWKH¿HOGVWDQGLQJJUDLQ,WLVQRVXUSULVHWKDWWKH³ROG´
PHWKRGRORJ\JDYHKLJKHUQXPEHUV WKDQ WKH³SUHVHQW´ WKH VXUSULVH LV WKDW DF-
FRUGLQJWR5RVVWDWIRUDQGERWKPHWKRGRORJLHVJDYHHTXDOYROXPHV
Therefore, one may doubt whether Rosstats re-estimations for the 1920s and 
WKHV ZHUH PDGH SURSHUO\ LQ SUDFWLFH WKLV DOVR PHDQV WKDW RQH FDQQRW
XVH ³ROG´GDWD WR LQWHUSRODWH ³QHZ´GDWD)RU WKLV UHDVRQZHSUHIHUUHG WRXVH
ERWK WLPHVHULHV LQSDUDOOHO RQH IRU WKH³SUHVHQW´PHWKRGRORJ\DQRWKHU²IRU
WKH³ROG´RQH
<HDUV 6RXUFH7LWOH$UFKLYHDQG&RGH Page(s)














B.4. Grain area planted
The grain area planted was counted by the Soviet statistical system beginning 





XVLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ IRU WKH8665DV DZKROH WKHFRUUHFWLRQZDV DSSUR[LPDWHO\













































B.5. New Residential Completions
Historical information on residential construction is less available than on 
other sectors of the Russian economy, at least those considered here. Publication 
of the RSFSRVGDWDRQQHZUHVLGHQWLDOFRPSOHWLRQVEHJDQLQZHFRXOGQRW
¿QGDQ\SUHYLRXVLQIRUPDWLRQHYHQLQXQSXEOLVKHGGRFXPHQWVVWRUHGLQDUFKLYHV
Our hypothesis relates this to the fact that the main goal of economic policy 
during the Soviet period was the creation of large-scale industrial establish ments, 
HVSHFLDOO\WKRVHZKLFKZHUHVSHFLDOL]HGLQSURGXFLQJPDFKLQHVDQGHTXLSPHQW
(capital goods). The communist and Soviet authorities paid far less attention to 
the production of consumer goods and to residential construction (it even seems 
that for years the Soviet statistics simply did not count the new houses built by 
collective farmers, which were the majority of the houses in rural areas). As 
WKHRI¿FLDO¿JXUHVIRUWRWDOQHZUHVLGHQWLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQFRQVLVWRIGLIIHUHQWFRP-
ponents for different years, we decided not to use them at all. Instead, we chose 
WKUHH WLPH VHULHV RQH IRU VWDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQV DQGHVWDEOLVKPHQWV LW LV URXJKO\
comparable for all years) and two for the population: for workers and employees 
XSWRDQGIRUWKHWRWDOSRSXODWLRQEHJLQQLQJLQZHKRSHWKDWWKHWUD-






















Railroad statistics for the RSFSR were openly published up to the mid-1930s 
DQGDIWHUZLWKPRUHWKDQD\HDUJDSLQEHWZHHQ:HIRXQGDOPRVWDOO
neces sary information in unpublished documents stored in archives. Unfortu-
QDWHO\DWWKHPRPHQWZHVWLOOKDYHWKUHHKROHVDQG±,WPDNHV
it impossible to say anything reasonable about the dynamics of railroad freight 
transportation during the second 5-year plan (1933–1937) but it is enough to 
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